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Introduction
The investigation of conceptual behavior has been largely confined to
problems involving nominal and discrete systems of classification. In
these studies, the subject is presented with a series of stimulus patterns
and is required to learn some principle of classification that relates
specific characteristics of the stimulus population. When the sequence
of stimuli is controlled by the experimenter the proced\ire is referred to
as the reception paradigm, A second type of procedure, not as commonly
employed, permits the subject to select his own sequence of stimuli with
the entire stimulus population constantly exposed; this procedure is referred
to as the selection paradigm.
Conceptual problems of the form noteJ above can be analyzed into two
structural components and the behavioral processes relevant to each of
these components can be distinguished (Haygood & Bourne, 19^5 ). First,
there are the stimulus characteristics which make up the experimenter-
chosen concept. These are called the relevant attributes; in typical
studies of conceptual behavior in which geometric designs are employed as
stimuli, attributes are values on relevant stimulus dimensions. Second,
there is the type of concept, represented by some rule for combining or
relating the relevant attributes to define the concept. For example, a
bidimensional principle for classification might specify that "all red
square figures are examples of the concept". In such a concept, color
and form are the relevant dimensions, while red and square are the relevant
attributes or values of the dimension; the conceptual rule is conjunction
or joint presence of attributes.
Corresponding to each of these structural components, relevant
attributes and conceptual rule, are two independent forms of behavior,
1
2(1) attribute identification, in which the subject attains or discovers
the relevant attributes, and (2) rule learning, in. which the subject
discovers the principle for categorizing stimuli in a particular problem,
and acquires the rule in general form so that he can use it in any problem.
Depending upon whether one or both of the structural components are
unknown the subject may be presented with three types of problem:
(1) attribute identification, in which the rule is explained at the outset
to the subject, (2) rule learning, in which the subject is told the relevant
attributes, and (3) complete learning, in which both the rule and relevant
attributes are unknown.
Most of the research on conceptual behavior has been focused on the
investigation of those variables which affect the discovery and utilization
of concepts (concept identification) rather than how concepts are initially
acquired (concept formation). One of the goals of research within the area
of concept identification is the identification and description of the
methods subjects utilize in solving such tasks. The major difficulty
in achieving this goal is that much of the solution-directed activity may
be covert and not subject to direct measurement. The observed behavior is
usually in the form of category responses where the subject designates
each stimulus as an example or nonexample of the concept. From these re-
sponses overall measures of behavior such as total errors and trials to
criterion may be obtained. However, these measures contribute little to
an understanding of the underlying processes involved in reaching solution.
What are needed are techniques which produce overt behavior in which the
underlying process is manifest. For example, if subjects are testing a
single hypothesis on each trial, then the requirement to state that
hypothesis would provide a direct measure of the process.
3Previous descriptions of how subjects solve conceptual problems have
been limited primarily to attribute identification. Several researchers
have adopted the view, stated above, that subjects solve such problems by
testing various hypotheses about which attributes or dimensions are relevant
to the solution; a view which has been incorporated with considerable suc-
cess in several mathematical models (e.g., Restle, 1962; Bower & Trabasso,
1964). The success of these models suggests that this view of subjects
as hypothesi's testers might profitably be extended to the more complex
complete learning situation. Haygood and Bourne (I965) have recently pro-
posed such an extension which has not yet been tested. The purpose of the
present study was to assess the validity of the Haygood and Bourne descrip-
tion and to examine hypothesis behavior directly in the complete learning
task under several different rules.
Conceptual System
The conceptual system relevant to the present discussion is a system
of constructing concepts based on at most two relevant attributes. In any
closed stimulus population defined by x independent dimensions with y
values each, there are y^ possible combinations of stimulus attributes.
If X and 2, then two attributes may be selected from separate dimensions
and the entire stimulus population may be mapped onto the four categories,
or contingencies, defined by the presence or absence of these attributes.
For example, if redness (R) and squareness (S) are so chosen, the four
contingencies defined are RS, RS, and RS (where the bar over a symbol
denotes not). By selecting these attributes as relevant attributes in
defining a concept, the four contingencies are mapped onto a two-response
system where the two responses denote examples and nonexamples of the
concept (positive (+) and negative (-) categories, respectively). This
mapping defines 1^ nontrivial unique distributions of these four contingenci
into either the positive or negative or negative category (two are trivial
because they place the entire pop\aation into either the positive or
negative category). This mapping is shown in Table 1 (reproduced from
Haygood & Bourne, 1965; T and F represent the true false notation used in
symbolic logic). Since four pairs are identical except for a change of
relevant attributes (B and C, E and G, H and I, and L and M) there are
only 10 different rules included in this set. These 10 fall into five
complementary pairs having the property that any instance which is positive
under one nua±)er of the pair is a negative instance under the other. These
complementary pairs are presented in Table 2 (modified from Haygood &
Bourne, 19^5).
Theoretical Description of Complete Learning Behavior
Under the complete learning procedure both the rule and relevant
attributes are unknown/ The proposal to be described below rests on the
assumption that the process \inderlying solution in the complete learning
task is similar to that which operates xmder the conditions of rule learn-
ing and attribute identification. This is the vie-<7 that subjects proceed
to solution by testing hypotheses about relevant aspects of the stimulus
situation. As noted above, this view has been incorporated in several
mathematical models of attribute identification (e.g., Restle, 1962).
The process during rule learning has not yet been formalized. Haygood and
Bourne (1965) suggest that in rvle learning subjects are testing hypotheses
about whether contingencies belong in positive or negative response
categories. This implies that subjects have achieved a receding of the
stimulus population into the four contingencies defined by the presence
or absence of the two relevant attributes which have been given to them.
It also implies an awareness that there are l6 possible response
assignments
obtainable by distributing the four contingencies into positive or negative
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7categories; and that as each new contingency occurs the subject reduces
the set of possible distributions until only the correct one remains. These
interpretations that hypothesis testing occurs in both rule learning and
attribute identification lead to the follo\7ing description of behavior
under complete learning. If both the rxile and the relevant attributes are
unknovm, the subject may (a) randomly select a pair of attributes on a
provisional basis for encoding into contingency categories
,
(b) test for
systematic assignment of the attribute contingencies to response categories,
and (c) reject the pair and select a nex^ one if test for consistent assign-
ments fails. The proposed description of behavior under complete learning
thus distinguishes two independent processes corresponding to discovery
of the two ^lnknox^ms; the testing of hypotheses about the correct pair of
attributes to be coded into contingencies, and the testing of hypotheses
about the distribution of response assignments for contingencies.
Examination of Processes in Complete Learning
One purpose of the present investigation was to examine the proposition
that subjects under the complete learning procedure behave in the manner
described in the preceding section. Haygood and Bourne have stated that
the validity of their assumptions is very likely limited to those subjects
who have attained mastery of several rules, and even then only under rule
learning where the relevant attributes are known to the subject. The
major difficulty in providing evidence to support or discredit this view
lies in the fact that the behavior in question is not directly observable.
If, however, subjects do come to recede the stimulus population into con-
tingencies, that is, to follow what Bourne (196?) has labeled the "truth
table" strategy, then it is reasonable to assume that pretraining in this
procedure should facilitate the learning of such a strategy. Three
experimental conditions were employed to test this assumption. One group
8(CL) was run xander the usual complete learning procedure. Two other
groups were required to learn the rules v/hile classifying stimuli into
contingencies. That is, subjects were instructed to categorize stimuli
into four categories on the basis of the presence or absence of the two
relevant attributes, as well as to learn the assignment of contingencies
into positive and negative categories on the basis of a selected conceptual
rule. These groups differed with respect to whether these two tasks were
learned successively or concurrently. For the successive group (CC),
subjects first learned contingency coding; that is, they learned to classify
the stimulus population into four categories on the basis of the presence
or absence of the two relevant attributes. This training was followed by
the learning of response assignments according to the applicable rule.
The concurrent group (CR) vjas required to classify stimulus patterns on
each trial into one of the four contingency categories, and also, on the
same trial, to designate the stimulus as either positive or negative.
Bourne (196?) has reported that subjects who were pretrained to classify
stimuli into contingencies performed better on rule learning problems
than subjects not pretrained. The relevant aspect of the results v;as that
the greatest improvement in performance by pretrained subjects was on
those rules typically found to be most difficult for subjects to learn.
The net effect was to reduce differences among conceptual rule learning
performance suggesting that subjects were follovang a similar strategy in
solving each of the different rules; which would be the case if subjects
were, in fact, using the truth table strategy. The procedure used in the
present study and that used by Bourne differed in that subjects in the
present study also were required to learn response assignments of the con-
tingencies to positive and negative categories according to the rules.
The success of the pretraining procedure was assessed by presenting half
of the subjects in each group a final problem under the complete learning
procedure. A second means of evaluation was to compare performance on
the final problem under complete learning against the results obtained by
simulating the proposed truth table strategy on a computer. The details
of the simulation procedure are described below.
Another line of evidence woiad be to actually observe that subjects
are categorizing stimuli on the basis of contingencies rather than infer
such behavior by comparison. The procedure used to obtain such evidence
is discussed in the next section.
Hypothesis Behavior
Although measures of overall performance (e.g., trials to criterion)
are useful in demonstrating the systematic relationship of behavior to
the m.anipulation of independent variables, they geneally do not contribute
to an understanding of the factors involved in the attainment of solution.
That is, what is the underlying process, what strategy do subjects follow,
in solving conceptual problems? For example, one independent variable
has been the type of conceptual rule employed. It is possible that the
type of rule (e.g., conjunction versus disjunction) may affect overall
performance while not changing the strategy employed by the subject. A
description of the nature of this process must be based on a detailed
analysis of the sequence of steps that subjects follow in order to achieve
success. For example, given a particular sequence of stimulus-response
outcomes, what was the hypothesis the subject was testing during this
series of trials?
One approach to the determination and evaluation of subject's
strategies that has been adopted is to require subjects on each trial to
state their hypothesis about the solution to the problem. This procedure
10
provides more detailed information about conceptual behavior than does
overall indices such as mean number of errors. For example, do subjects
retain the same hypothesis after a correct response, an assumption in-
corporated into previous mathematical models? This procedure also enables
the investigator to examine trial-by-trial changes in behavior, as re-
flected by changes in hypotheses from trial to trial as a function of such
variables as the sequence of stimuli. An obvious problem here is the
possibility that such a requirement itself produces changes in the under-
lying process as reflected by measures of overall performance. Since
comparison of overall performance with and without the requirement to
state hypotheses had not previously been carried out, this was included
as part of the design of the present study.
The procedure employed in the present study vras to divide the subjects
in each of the three training conditions (CL, CC, CR) into three hypothesis
conditions to be described beloxT, One group (IH) which xdJJL be referred
to as the implicit hypothesis group was presented the entire stimiilus
population one at a time and required to classify each stimulus without
receiving any feedback. These subjects then classified each of the stimuli
in the U5ual manner, that is, one at a time with informative feedback on
each trial. This procedure bears some similarity to the blank trials
procedure initiated by Levine (e.g., 1966) which permits the tracking of
a subject's current hypothesis under the assumption that subjects, without
intervening reinforcement, will categorize all stimuli on the basis of a
single hypothesis. If subjects do, in fact, behave in this manner, this
strategy vrill produce a recognizable, unique series of responses
isomorphic to the stimulus series on those trials. This procedure would
therefore indicate whether subjects are categorizing on the basis of
contingencies
,
11
In order to evaluate whether the requireaient to state hypotheses pro-
duces any change in behavior, a second group (NH) was run without the
requirement to state hypotheses. Finally, a third group (KH) was run
under the more common procedure (e.g., Bourne, I965) wherein on each trial
subjects explicitly verbalized the basis for their response and received
feedback. This group X'jas included to provde a stronger test of the pos-
sibility that the hypothesis requirement alters behavior since it is more
in keeping with the standard procedure,
Trabasso and Bower Model
One mathematical model that is relevant to the present study is a
three-state Markov model that was proposed by Trabasso and Bower (196^)
to describe behavior in four-category concept problems. The subject's
task in these problems is to classify all stimuli into four categories
on the basis of two relevant dimensions. For example, if size and form
are relevant and these dimensions take on the values large and small and
circle and square, respectively, then Category 1 may contain all large
circles, Category 2 all large squares, Category 3 all small circles, and
Category ^ all small squares. According to a hjrpothesis proposed by
Bourne and Restle (1959) f subjects solve the four-category problem by
learning two binary subproblems. In the example given above, the two
subproblems are associated with the size and form dimensions. The size
subproblem is that large patterns are in categories 1 or 2 and small
patterns are in categories 3 or The form subproblem is that circles
are in categories 1 or 3 and squares are in categories 2 or ^. The
Trabasso and Bower model assumes that there are two All-or-None learning
processes going on concvirrently, one per subproblem. The model does not
distinguish between the subproblems so that at the beginning of any trial
12
the subject may be characterized as having solved either 0, 1, or 2 of
the subproblems. Corresponding to each of these levels of knowledge,
there are three states of a Markov chain, all subjects being in state 0
on Trial 1 and eventually becoming absorbed in state 2 when the complete
problem is solved.
The Trabasso and Bower model is directly applicable to those subjects
who were required to solve each problem by first learning to classify
stimuli on i^he basis of the four relevant attribute combinations (Group
CC). Of especial interest is the assumption of the model that responses
prior to the last error are stationary and independent observations from
a binomial series. Trabasso and Bower found that, in contradiction to the
above assumptions, response sequences were neither stationary nor independ-
ent. These authors suggested the possibility that these results were pro-
duced by some terminal paired-associate learning that was necessary to
connect the correct responses to the four relevant stimulus combinations.
This occurs because of a lack of symmetry in response assignments. In
order to overcome this problem it was suggested that the paired-associate
learning coiild be minimized by utilizing two-component responses (e.g.,
Al, A2, Bl, B2) which mirror the logical structure of the four stimulus
combinations. Since subjects in Group CC were reqiiired to use the truth-
table format in reporting their responses (i.e., TT, TF, FT, FF), the
data from these subjects provided a test of this suggestion. A final
purpose of the present study, then, was to determine the applicability of
the Trabasso and Bower assumptions to the pretraining data on the
learning of contingencies.
Method
Subjects and design.—Students from introductory psychology served
as subjects as part of the course requirement. Students were randomly
13
assigned to one of nine training conditions derived by combining the three
methods for learning contingencies and their assignment to response
categories (complete learning (CL), successive contingency learning (CC),
and conciirrent contingency learning (CR)) mth the three hypothesis require-
ments (no hypothesis (NH), explicit hypothesis (EH), and implicit hypothesis
(IH)), There were 12 subjects assigned to each of the above nine condi-
tions for a total of 108 subjects.
The experiment consisted of txro parts. During Part I each subject
received three consecutive problems based on three different nies : con-
jimction, inclusive disjunction, and biconditional. Each of two subjects
in each treatment combination received one of the six possible orders of
presentation. A fourth rule, affirmation was used as an example of con-
ceptual rules, and explained during initial instructions. Part II involved
the transfer of half the subjects in each of the nine conditions to a
problem presented under the complete learning procedure. The other
half of the subjects v/ere given a fourth problem under their initial
training procedure. The problem given during transfer was based on the
second rule presented during Part I. The two relevant attributes for
each problem were counterbalanced for problem, order, relevant rule, and
subjects.
Materials,—The stimulus patterns were geometric designs drawn on
3x5 inch white cards. Stimulus patterns varied on four binary-valued
dimensions. Dimensions and their values were: form, circle and square;
number, one and tvro figxires; size, large and small; and color, red and
blue.
A sample card listing aXi possible values of the
dimensions was left
exposed for the subjects reference at all times. After each problem was
solved the subject was presented with a rule card containing a detailed
explanation of the rule used during that problem.
Task and procedure.
—Daring Part I subjects trained under CC were
reqxiired to classify patterns into four categories designated TT, TF, FT,
and FF according to the presence or absence of the tv;o relevant attributes
(these designations conform to the true-false notation in Table 1). After
16 consecutive successes subjects continued to classify patterns into
these four categories and in addition, were required to learn to designate
each pattern as positive or negative on the basis of the relevant rule for
that problem imtil reaching a criterion of l6 consecutive successes on
this aspect of the problem. Subjects trained under CR were required,
on each trial, to classify patterns into one of the four categories noted
above, received feedback on the correctness of their classification,
and then designated that pattern as positive or negative and received
feedback on the latter response assignment. The criterion for CR was 16
consecutive successes; a success was recorded if the subject classified
a stimulus correctly on the basis of both the true-false assignment and
the positive-negative assignment. Finally, subjects in CL were required
to classify patterns into either the positive or negative category. The
criterion for CL was also 16 consecutive successes. During Part II
subjects were presented with a problem based on the second rule presented
during Part I. Ha "l f were run under the procedure followed during Part I,
half were transferred to the complete learning procedure.
One third of the subjects in each of the above three training groups
were assigned to one of the three hypothesis conditions. Those subjects
who were required to state their hypothesis verbally on each trial (EH)
were asked to indicate x^hich two attributes they vreTe basing their
response upon. The responses were those described above for CL, CC, and
CR. Those subjects who were assigned to the implicit hypothesis group (IH)
were presented each of the l6 stimuli in the stimulus population one at a
15
time and asked to classify each stimulus without feedback. The classi-
fications during blank trials were those appropriate to their training
condition, that is, CL, CC, or CR. These subjects were then presented
each of the 16 sticauli again but this time received feedback after each
classification.
Finally, in order to insure an equal occurrence of each of the four
contingencies
,
the stimulus population was randomized over each block of
16 trials. This procedure differs from the Haygood and Bo\irne (I965)
method which insured the occurrence of at least one instance of each of
the four contingencies during each block of I6 trials and which equated
the stiraulvis sequence for positive and negative instances. Since recent
evidence (Haygood & Devine, 196?) indicated that it is the proportion of
TT instances that influences behavior, and not the proportion of positive
instances, the procediire employed in the present study was adopted.
Results and Discussion
Rule and Problem Difficulty
With one exception (Laughlin & Jordan, 196?), previous research has
indicated that the order of difficulty among the conceptual rules employed
in the present study is, from most to least difficult, biconditional,
inclusive disjunction, and conjunction. In the one exception, Laughlin
and Jordan found disjunction to be the most difficult. The order of
difficulty in the present study is in accord vnLth the usual findings as
indicated by separate analyses of variance performed on errors and trials
to criterion (p .01), Laughlin and Jordan suggested that the reason
for this discrepancy might be due to either the use of binary-valued
dimensions or the use of the selection paradigm which were employed in
their investigation. Since in the present study binary dimensions were
employed but the reception paradigm was used, it may be concluded, until
16
a more direct test is made, that the discrepancy is the result of the
above authors choice of the selection paradigm.
Analyses of variance on errors and trials revealed a significant
improvement in performance across problems (p < .025). Analysis of trials,
but not errors, also indicated a significant interaction of rules and con-
tingency training (p^ .O5). This result \J3.s due to the fact that
differences in difficulty among rules, as reported above, were greatly
reduced under CC and CR.
Pretraining and Transfer Results
The results of pretraining subjects to classify stimuli according to
contingencies are shown in Table 3 which presents errors and trials to
criterion for the nine training combinations as well as the results of
the transfer problem which was presented under the complete learning
procedure. Subjects who were trained under CL committed more errors
(p <• ,05) and needed more trials to reach criterion (p <_ .001) than did
those subjects trained under CC and CR,
There are two possible explanations for these results; first, con-
sider the follomng analysis. Subjects trained under CL must discover
both the rule and relevant attributes. On the other hand, subjects in
CC and CR, although they too must discover both unknovms, have these two
problems separated for them by the structure of the experimental task.
The contingency coding portion of each problem represents a task that is
equivalent to attribute identification since the rule (sort on the basis
of the presence or absence of the two relevant attributes) is know. The
remainder of the problem is equivalent to a rule learning task in that
subjects must learn how the four combinations of the two relevant
attributes are distributed into the positive and negative categories.
The major difference between CC and CR is that the former group has
1?
Table 3
Errors and Trials to Criterion During Transfer and Training
Training
Trials Errors
CL cc CR CL cc CR
NH
IH
EH
36.2
38.8
^3.6
23.9
20 6
17.^
20.3
23.8
26.8
28.3
15.3
15.9
15.8
12.7
10.5
9.9
16.6
7.7
18.0
1^.8
11.4
14.6
Avg. 39.6 20.7 18.2
Transfer
15.7 11.1
NH
IH
EH
28.0
55.8
26.1
J^5.6
21.3
^7.3
31.0
25.6
57.5
3^.8
3^.2
43.6
9.8
22.0
12.1
12.7
12.7
12.7
11.2
9.3
9.5
11.2
14.7
11.4
Avg, 36.7 38.1 38.0 1^.7 12.7 10.0
18
already learned to classify each stimulus according to the four con-
tingencies, whereas Group CR, until this aspect of the problem is solved,
are given this information on each trial by the experimenter through the
feedback process employed. Both groups must then discover whether each
of the four contingencies is a positive or negative instance of the concept.
The above analysis may be interpreted to indicate that these findings are
in agreement ;d-th Haygood and Bourne's (I965) conclusion that the two
processes under CL combine in such a way as to make learning more diffi-
cult, than would be the case if the two processes simply combined in an
additive fashion.
A second explanation is that under CC and CR subjects are receiving
more information from the experimenter on each trial than under CL. In
CL subjects are merely informed on each trial whether a stimulus belongs
in the positive or negative category. Depending upon the rvCLe, this means
that both, one, or none of the two relevant attributes may be present.
In CC and CR, however, subjects are receiving information about the
presence or absence of the relevant attributes. Such information can be
utilized by efficient subjects to make comparisons between stimuli from
one trial to the next. The most striking example would be when an instance
of TT is presented on two successive trials and the values of the two
irrelevant dimensions changed on these two trials. An observant subject
would have learned that the two unchanged attributes represented the TT
instance of the relevant pair. The learning of the assignment of con-
tingencies to positive and negative categories probably is no more
difficult than a simple paired-associate task with four items to be
learned
.
We now turn to consideration of the results of the transfer problem
which was run under the complete learning procedure. Bourne (196?)
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previously had found that subjects pretrained on contingencies performed
better than subjects who did not receive such training. The results of
the transfer problem in the present study cannot be interpreted to support
a similar conclusion. Analyses of variance performed on errors and trials
to criterion, did not disclose any reliable difference between subjects
previously trained under CC and CR, and those subjects trained under CL.
These results are presented in Table 3 under Transfer. The failure to
find any transfer following contingency training would appear to conflict
with Bourne's findings. However, in the Bourne study, subjects v^ere
switched to a rule learning task rather than a complete learning problem
as in the present study. If the relevant attributes are known, the useful-
ness of the truth-table strategy may be more apparent to subjects, vrhereas
under complete learning, subjects may resort to other as yet untried
strategies, or perhaps some mixture of the two.
Whether subjects were using the truth-table strategy during transfer
can not be determined from these results. In order to determine what
would be expected if subjects were proceeding according to the truth-
table strategy, a computer simulation of the strategy proposed by Haygood
and Bourne was performed on a high speed digital computer. Each single
run through the sim\LLation program represented the simulation of a single
subject. For each of the three conceptual rules employed in the present
study, the simi:ilation procedure to be described below was performed 18
times to correspond to the actual number of subjects run during transfer.
For each run, the input data consisted of the stimulus sequence to be
used, the two attributes selected as relevant for that simulated subject,
the conceptual rule, and the array of positive and negative assignments
of the entire stimulus population as determined by the choice of relevant
attributes and conceptual rule. In additon, an array of all possible
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pairs of attributes which coiad be obtained from the existing stimulus
population under the restriction that each attribute vms from a different
stimulus dimension was read into the computer, and was available as the
hypothesis pool from which the simulated subjects selected sample attribute
pairs for testing. Each run was initialized by the random selection of
a pair of attributes from the hypothesiis pool, e.g., red and square. A
contingency array was established which identified each of the 16 possible
stimuli in terms of the truth-table format, e.g., red and square (TT),
red and not sqiiare (TF), not red and square (FT), and not red and not
square (FF). The first stimulus in the sequence was then presented. The
program proceeded to scan the contingency array until a match was made
with the just presented stimulus. The contingency identification, e.g.,
TT, associated with that stimulus was noted as well as whether that con-
tingency had been assigned a response label (positive or negative).
If no response label was found, a designation of positive or negative
was randomly generated. The program then presented the correct assign-
ment (reinforcement). If reinforcement agreed with the response label
just generated, the entire contingency array v:as scanned to locate each
of the other three instances of that contingency, and that response label
was assigned to each of these instances. If the reinforcement did not
agree with the response label generated by the simulated subject, that
label was changed to agree with the reinforcement, and the scanning and
labeling procedure was then carried out, Folloid.ng this the next stimulus
was presented and the above procedure was repeated. This procedure was
continued until a trial on which a scan of the contingency array produced
a response label which did not agree ;d.th the reinforcement given on
that trial. Since a response label could not be retrieved from a scan
of the contingency array unless prior reinforcement of that contingency
21
instance had occurred, this discrepancy between response label and rein-
forcement constituted rejection of the hypothesis that the attribute pair
encoded in the contingency array was the correct or relevant pair. A
new pair of attributes was then selected from the entire pool of attribute
pairs, and the simulation continued. On each trial counters kept track
of the number of errors and trials and the number of consecutive successes.
The run was terminated as soon as the criterion of 16 consecutive successes
was reached. The data from these simulations v:as used to compute the
average number of errors and trials to solution. The performance of
these simulated subjects in terms of average number of errors (^1.2) and
trials to solution (77.2) when compared with the obtained results shown
in Table 3, clearly indicate that such a strategy is highly inefficient
compared to actual performance.
There may be several reasons for this finding not the least of which
is that in the present study, subjects simply did not resort to the truth
table strategy. First, subjects may have learned the truth-table strategy
but discarded it in favor of more efficient methods. In fact, if a
subject knows the strategy, then a modified version in which the subject
tested two dimensions at a time rather than two attributes would be more
efficient. Such a strategy is possible because of the symmetry of binary
dimensions. If an inconsistent response assignment is obtained for any
of the four attribute combinations defined by the two dimensions selected,
those dimensions could be eliminated as the relevant pair. Any incon-
sistent assignment would imply that one or both of these two dimensions
are irrelevant. This is time because for any of the four cotribinations
of attributes, response assignments would be consistent no matter which
combination was chosen by the experimenter to be relevant. Using this
method the subject is dealing with a set of possibilities one fourth as
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large as would be the case V7hen testing pairs of attributes. In effect,
the subject eliminates four pairs of attributes rather than one pair each
time an inconsistent assignment occurs. The subject would continue to
select and eliminate pairs of dimensions until the problem is solved.
A second reason for the inefficiency of the truth table strategy is
that simulation was conducted under the assumption of no memory for
previously tested attribute pairs. That is, subjects were assumed to
resample frqm the entire population of pairs of attributes. Although
this assumption may not be unreasonable as a first approximation, it is
unrealistic in the present study in the light of recent evidence of the
role of memory in concept learning (c.f.
,
Chumbley, 196?). It is more
reasonable to assume that memory was an important factor in the present
study since the stimulus population was quite small and the task was self-
paced. Subjects should have little difficulty under these conditions
remembering a number of previous attribute pairs already tested and
eliroinated from consideration. In other words, subjects, up to some limit,
are sampling without replacement. These results in themselves, do not,
of course, preclude the use of the truth table strategy in the present
study, but merely the sampling assumption employed. Evidence to be
discussed in the next section bears more directly on the vise of the truth
table strategy in the present experiment.
Finally, tx^o other results obtained during transfer should be noted.
Analysis of variance performed on trials to criterion but not errors
revealed that the order of difficulty among conceptual rules found during
training still obtained during transfer (p < .001). There was also an
interaction between contingency training and hypothesis requirements
(p < .01). Subjects previously trained under CL and IH took longest to
solve the transfer problem with NH and EH subjects finding the problem
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easier. This result was reversed for subjects trained iinder CC and CR.
Hypothesis Behavior
In this section, we consider the analysis of the behavior of those
subjects required to explicitly state their hypotheses (EH) and those
subjects run under the implicit hypothesis condition (IH).
A finding of major interest is that the results of analyses of
Variances performed on errors and trials did not reveal any reliable
differences ,i between subjects not required to provide information on
their hypotheses, and those subjects in the explicit and implicit hypothesis
conditions. Although it is possible that this finding is peculiar to the
present study, the result is certainly not trivial, but has important
empirical and theoretical implications. The procedure represents a
valuable technique for obtaining information, and is in keeping with the
arguments presented by Battig and Bourne (196?) for maximizing observable
behavior in complex tasks such as concept learning. Such a procedure is
also valuable because many mathematical models of the concept learning
process assume that subjects are selecting hypotheses on the basis of
aspects of the stimuli to which they are exposed, and subjects stating
their hypotheses would provide a clearer picture of the sampling process,
and their preferences for particular dimensions; which for the sake of
mathematical convenience are assumed to be equally salient.
Another advantage of having subjects state their hypotheses is that
this procedure permits a direct assessment of the assumption typically
incorporated into mathematical models that subjects stay with the same
hypothesis whenever they are correct. The reasoning behind this assumption
is that a correct response does not provide any information that would
give a subject any basis for changing his hypothesis; that is, if the
subject is correct he can do no better than with his current
hypothesis.
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In at least one stucJy, hoi^ever, in contradiction to this assumption it
was found that subjects do change their hypotheses after correct trials
(Suppes & Schlag-Rey, I965). The conclusion of these authors was that
subjects simultaneously are testing several hypotheses, only one of which
is overt on any trial. Positive reinforcement of the overt hypothesis
may represent negative reinforcement of other covert hypotheses causing
a change in the hierarchy of the hypothesis pool. It has also been
assumed thati each time the subject is incorrect he returns the disconfirmed
hypothesis to the pool and resamples.
In order to determine the validity of these assumptions for the present
study, the data of subjects in each of the three explicit hypothesis con-
ditions (CLEH, CCEH, CREH) vras examined. Table k presents, for each of
the three training conditions, problem by problem analysis of the probability
that a subject retained the same (S) hypothesis given that he was correct
(c), P(SlC), and the probability that a subject selected a different (D)
hypothesis given that he was wrong (//), P(Dl i-/). Also included are the
totals for each training condition, and total proportions pooled over
problems and groups. For groups CC and CR these statistics were computed
only with respect to responses on contingency assignments.
It is clear from Table 4 that subjects did change their hypothesis
after correct trials (P = .11), and retained an incorrect hypothesis
following error trials (P = .15). These results run counter to the
intuitatively reasonable assumption incorporated in previous models that
subjects retain a correct hypothesis and always resample after errors.
Although subjects, if sampling with replacement, could resample the same
hypothesis, it is highly unlikely that such a high proportion would occur
by chance alone. Also, as noted above, it is highly likely that in the
present study subjects are sampling vrithout replacement. Table ^ does
Table ^
Proportion of Subjects Retaining the Same (S) Hypothesis
When Correct (C), P(S|C), and Selecting a Different (D)
Hypothesis 'v!hen v^rong (vJ), P
Problem
Group 1 2 3 4 Total
CLEH P(S| C) .83 .89• .90 .93 .85
P(D| W) .86 .81 .76 .74 .80
CCEH P(S( C) .91 .95 1.00 .95 .95
P(D| W) .79 .95 .97 .98 .92
CREH P(S(C) .83 .98 .77 .89 .85
P(D|V/) .84 .82 .90 .90 .86
Total P(S(C) .84 .91 .88 .93 .89
P(D( W) .84 .84 .87 .84 .85
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reveal that the general trend in CL and CC is for subjects to become
more likeQ;/ to retain a correct hypothesis as training continues, and
similarly, as training continues, subjects in CC and CR are more likely
to discard an incorrect hypothesis.
The closeness of the two statistics suggests that a similar process
may be responsible for both discrepancies. One possible explanation is
that these deviations from optimal strategy represent a lag in the processing
of information from previous trials. The subject is "biding his time"
while processing and does not make the change until enough information has
been processed for him to make his decision about a new hypothesis. In
the interim, the subject retains his current hypothesis; thus a correct
hypothesis is changed because of a delayed decision, and an incorrect
hypothesis is retained until enough information has been accrued to make
a decision.
We now turn to further evidence on the proposal that subjects come to
employ the truth table strategy. The results to be presented below
represent an analysis of the response protocols of subjects in the three
IH groups. In these conditions subjects were presented alternating series
of each of the 16 stimuli, each stimulus being presented one at a time.
The first series was presented ^>dthout any feedback, the second series
was the customary one in which feedback was presented after each classifi-
cation. If subjects are classifying stimuli in CL on the basis of the
presence or absence of the two attributes they believe to be relevant, it
should be possible to determine this, since each instance of the four
contingencies, TT, TF, FT, and FF will be treated alike. The relevant data
are presented in Table 5«
For each of the groups discussed below, classification of stimuli
during blank trials were made in accordance with the requirement for that
Table 5
Proportion of Subjects Giving Consistent Respons
Assignments During Blank Trials for Each
Training Condition and Each Problem
Problem
Group 1 2 3 Total
CLIH .18 .26 .1^ .15 .19
CCIH .58 .61 .68
.75 .63
CRIH
.77 .95 .79 .75 .80
Total
.56
.53 .5^ .51
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group, that is. CL, CC, or CR. Looking first at CLIH it is obvious that
few subjects classified stimuli on these trials in any manner consistent
with the possible pool of two-attribute hypotheses. Further, there is no
indication that subjects learn to do so across problems, if anything,
there is a decrease in the proportion of consistent classifications. A
possible explanation other than lack of attention or forgetting of the
hypothesis, is that subjects are entertaining hypotheses more complex
than that demanded by the task. The situation is somewhat better in CCIH
where consistent classifications are made .63 of the time, and there is
improvement across problems. However, for this group the task is more
structured than in CL so that any complex hypotheses as postulated for
CL subjects are less likely, and more consistent patterns of responding
would be expected. Another reason for not assuming that these results
reflect forgetting of the hypothesis is that subjects in CRIH are even
more consistent than those in CC, and subjects in CR must also recall
whether they classified each stimulus as positive or negative thus imposing
a larger memory load. On balance it would appear that even when the
problem is structured in such a way as to produce a series of responses
consistent with the truth table strategy there is considerable failure to
do so.
Analysis of Four-Category Data
As noted above, one third of the subjects in the present experiment
were required to learn the three conceptual rules in two phases. During
the first phase, subjects were required to classify patterns into the four
categories defined by the presence or absence of the tvro relevant
attributes using the truth table format. In this system of reporting
responses, the designation TT meant that the subject believed that boty
relevant attributes were present, TF that one relevant attribute was
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present and the second attribute absent and so on. During the second
phase of these probletns subjects were required to learn to classify stimu-
lus patterns into positive and negative response categories on the basis
of the rule selected for that problem. Until subjects begin the second
phase in this condition, they are confronted with a four-category concept
learning task as studied by Trabasso and Bower (196^).
Analysis of this data for the first problem presented each subject
was to have ,been performed in terms of the Trabasso and Bower three-state
Markov model described in the introduction. Apart from the consideration
that the present data afforded a further test of the Trabasso and Bower
interpretation, there was the additional consideration that the use of the
truth table format of reporting responses, provided a test of the above
authors' suggestion that their finding of nonstationarity and nonindependence
resulted from terminal paired-associate learning, due to the fact that the
responses used in their study (1, 2, 3, ^), did not mirror the four
combinations of the two relevant dimensions as would txro-component re-
sponses such as used in the present study (TT, TF, FT, FF).
Due to a procedural error to be described below, the Trabasso and
Bower model could not be tested against the present data, however, the
results of analysis of presolution data will be reported. Before con-
sidering these results, however, we shall describe a second, more
parsimonious model, which derives from consideration of the structure of
the truth table, and for which a partial test was available. If a subject
has discovered the two relevant attributes (Category TT), then he is
able to correctly classify all stimuli using the truth table format,
A simple strategy would be to select a pair of attributes to be classified
as TT, and classify all stimuli on this basis until the pair has been
disconfirmed. The subject then selects another pair as his hypothesis
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and continues until he has discovered the relevant pair attributes. The
subject may be conceptualized as being in one of two states on any trial;
a selection state in which he selects the correct pair of attributes with
probability h, and a solution state in wlaich the subject has discovered
the two relevant attributes and has solved the problem. It is further
assumed that subjects can solve the problem only after an error. The model
is consistent with previous hypothesis-testing models which have been
applied to tihe learning of unidimensional concepts with the exception
that subjects are testing hypotheses about two values rather than one.
Because of the procedural error to be described below, any statistic
which involves error rate is inappropriate. The procedural error occurred
as the result of an attempt to avoid confusion on the part of the subject,
with respect to what was meant by the experimenter's reply of either TF
of FT, In order to avoid confusion, each subject, when presented with
the list of dimensions and attributes, was advised that the order of
reporting would correspond to the order listed on their card. As will
be seen belox-r this procedure leads to variation in the subject's error
rate as a function of the eixperinenter ' s selection of the two relevant
dimensions in combination with the subject's choice of dimensions.
In order to illustrate the problem, we consider the case in which the
subject has selected one of the two correct dimensions and is always
correct with respect to reporting true or false on that dimension. Let
us label the four dimensions I, II, III, IV to represent the order of
reporting utilized by the experimenter. Table 6 illustrates the possible
outcomes given the two dimensions chosen by the experimenter to be
relevant, the two dimensions selected by the subject, and the error rates
corresponding to each combination of these two.
Table 6
Error Rates Given Possible Orders of Report*
Relevant
Combination
Subject's Error
Kate
1,11 I.X**
II .X
• r5
I, III I»x .'50
II, III
III, IV
• fj
I,IV ItX
x,IV
II,in I. II
II, IV
I, III
III, IV 7*5
II, IV I. II 7*5
II, III .50
x.IV
.50
III,IV x.III
.75
x,IV .50
* Roman numerals identify dimensions according to order reported
**x represents any irrelevant dimension
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It can be seen from Table 6 that any time the subject reports the
correct dimension in the order opposite to the order reported by the
experimenter, his error rate will be
.75; on all other occasions his
error rate will be
.50. As an example, consider the second possibility
listed in Table 6, The experimenter has chosen dimensions I and II and
the subject dimensions II and x. Thus the subject always reports
dimension II first x^hereas the experimenter always reports it second. Let
us assume that the second dimension selected by the subject is dimension
III (the analysis holds for" all cases in which the order is reversed).
Using the true (T) - false (F) notation, and keeping in mind that the
subject is always correct on dimension II, it may be seen from Table 7
that only two of the possible combinations will lead to a correct answer;
thus error rate is .75. A similar analysis will indicate that when the
subject's order of reporting corresponds to experimenter's order error
probability will be .50.
We now turn to consideration of a statistic predicted by the hypothesis
model that is independent of error rate. If the above assumptions are
correct then the cumulative distribution of errors, Pr(T^ k), is given by
Pr(T^ k) = 1 - (1 - h)
since the subject can only solve the problem followjjig an error, and this
error is the final error with probability h. The cumiilative probability
distribution of errors is presented in Table 8 for selected values of T,
The value of h was estimated from the equation for the expected total errors
E(T) = 1/h
and was found to be ,09 for the present data. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test
was used to evaluate goodness of fit. The largest discrepancy (.07)
occurred at the value T = ^, but is not large enough to cause rejection of
the null hypothesis (N = 36 cases, p > .20).
33
Table 7
Illustration of Possible Outcomes with Reversed
Order of Reporting*
Dimensions
Relevant
I
T
T
T
T
F
F
F
F
II
T
T
F
F
T
T
F
F
Irrelevant
III
T
F
T
F
T
F
T
F
Outcome
Correct
Wrong
Wrong
Wrong
Wrong
Wrong
Wrong
Correct
Subject is reporting II and III and is always correct on II
Table 8
Distribution of Total Errors, T
Pr(T^ k)
k Observed Predicted
0-3
.250
^-7
.472
.^33
8-11
.611 .6if6
D^-15 .750
.757
16-19 .833 R3/J.
20-23 ,m .886
2^-27
.972 .922
28-31
.972 .9^7
32-35 1.000 .964
Maximum Discrepancy = .073 at T = 4
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Both the two-state hypothesis oiodel and the three-state subproblem
model predict stationarity and independence for the appropriate response
sequences. In the latter case, the assumptions refer to response sequences
derived from each subproblem; that is, responses were scored as correct or
incorrect in terras of each relevant dimension providing two response
protocols for each subject. The results of the analyses of presolution
data were mixed for each model; the data indicated nonstationarity, as
previously found by Trabasso and Bower, while the assumption of independence
was confirmed. We turn first to the evidence on the subproblem model.
For the stationarity test, the success probability during the first half
(.5^1) was compared to the success probability during the second half
(.623) prior to the last error. This represents a significant increase
in success rate (t = 2.^, df =58, p ^ .02). For the test of independence,
the conditional probability of a success was
.579 following a success,
and .552 following an error. The based on IO69 observations does not
permit rejection of the null hypothesis (X^ = .77, df = 1, p > .20).
The finding of nonstationarity despite the use of two-component responses
implies that a process other than terminal paired-associate learning may
be responsible. One such candidate, also suggested by Trabasso and Boi'ier,
may be that retention of the first subproblem is interfered with by the
learning of the second subproblem, and that this effect is reduced during
the second half of learning.
With respect to the two-state model the same results were obtained
as for the three-state model. Again there was a significant increase in
success rate from the first half (.3^) to the second half (.^79) of the
problem (t = 2.82, df = 32, p <.01). The test for independence also
gave similar results. The conditional probability of a success following
a success was .^15 and following an error was .379. The based on 637
observations did not reach significance (X^ = .85, df = 1, p > .20).
ee
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Sumtnary and Conclusions
The results of the present experiment fail to confirm the assumption
that subjects are utilizing a truth table strategy as proposed by Haygood
and Bourne (I965). The possibility remains that this finding is true
only in the case where binaiy dimensions are used and/or memory is an
important factor. If the memory assumption is the only fault then it is
merely necessary to modify the sampling assumptions of the theory. More
likely is the possibility that, as suggested by Haygood and Bourne, the
truth table strategy would emerge with the use of highly practiced subjects
for whom mastery of the rules can reasonably be assured. A more appropriat
test of the Haygood and Bourne model would be an investigation of complet
learning under conditions identical to those the above authors employed
in drawing their conclusions (i.e., where each of the k stimulus dimensions
has at least three values), and to compare this condition with one in
which subjects are explicitly instructed and trained in the use of the
truth table strategy. The sampling assumption could also be examined by
asking half the subjects to state their hypothesis on each trial.
The present results also conflict with previous assumptions that
subjects always retain a correct hypothesis and always discard an in-
correct hypothesis. Two possible explanations were discussed; the existence
of a covert hierarchy of hypotheses, and a delay in the processing of
information from previous trials. The first possibility may be tested
by asking subjects to state, on each trial, all hypotheses which they are
considering at that time, and to rate each on a scale of confidence.
The second possibility may be evaluated by asking subjects to state on
each trial the basis for their current response as well as all those
hypotheses which they have just eliminated. The change of a correct
hypothesis should be reflected by its inclusion in the eliminated list
in
on that trial. Similarly, an incorrect hypothesis woxild not appear
the list if retained on that trial but would occur on a later trial.
The finding in the present study that the hypothesis groups did not
differ encourages the use of such procedures as these, although a control
group should be included until these results have been replicated.
Finaiy, the replication of Trabasso and Bower's finding of non-
stationarity in the four-category task when two-component responses are
used indicates that another explanation must be found, such as a test of
the possibility that this result is due to interference of the first
subproblem learned due to subsequent learning of the second subproblem.
This possibility can be tested by the simple procedure of informing sub-
jects on each trial of the correct half of the two-category response once
they have achieved criterion on that dimension.
In summary, the results of the present experiment a) do not support
the truth table strategy assumption, b) support the usefulness of asking
subjects their hypotheses, c) suggest that assumptions of previous models
may be in error about the v:ay subjects process hypotheses on correct and
incorrect trials, and d) again disconfirm the stationarity assumption of
the Trabasso and Bower (1964) model.
APPENDIXES
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APPENDIX A
Summary of Analysis of Variance on Trials to
Criterion and Errors, Training
Source of Variance
Between Ss
Contingency (C)
Hypotheses (H)
Sequence (Sq)
C X H
Sq int
Error
Within Ss
Problems (P)
Ordinal Position (O)
C X
C X
H X
H X
C X
C X
Error
df
107
2
2
5
216
2
2
8
8
180
Trials
F-ratio
3^.86***
12,37***
7,87***
2.47*
Errors
F-ratio
3.18*
5,03**
4.51*
Total 323
^0
APPENDIX B
Summary of Analysis of Variance on Trials to
Criterion and Errors, Transfer
Source of Variance df
Contingency (C) 2
I^otheses (H) 2
Rules (R) 2
0 X H k
C X R
H X R
C X H X R 8
Error 27
Trials Errors
F-ratio F-ratio
11.02***
4.32**
Total 53
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APPENDIX C
Blank Trials Procedure
One third of all subjects in the three contingency training condi-
tions; CL, CC, CR, were run under the implicit hypothesis requirement in
which blank trials were employed. There are a number of different methods
that may be employed under the description of blank trials; in each case
the designation refers to the presentation of stimuli without feedback
from the exporimenter. The description that will be given below for CL
holds for the other tv70 training conditions, CC and CR, with the only
exception that each group was required to give those responses designated
for that condition. Thus subjects in CL made positive and negative
classifications during blank trials, as well as during reinforced
(feedback) trials; subjects in CC classified each stimulus on the basis
of the truth-table format until that phase of the problem had been solved,
and then classified stimuli into positive and negative categories for the
remainder of the problem. Subjects under CR requirements made both
truth-table and positive-negative category responses during blank and
feedback trials. With the exception of the response requirements, the
procedure was as fo]J.ows, Each problem was begun by presenting the first
stimulus in the sequence and asking the subject to classify that stimulus.
Following the subject's response, the next stimulus was presented vdthout
any designation by the experimenter as to the correctness of the subject's
previous classification. Each of the remaining stimuli were likewise
presented one at a time for classification without feedback, until the
subject had classified each of the l6 stimuli included in the stimulus
population used in the present study. Following classification of the
last stimulus to be presented, the first stimulus was presented again
and the subject classified that stimulus for the second time. Following
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the subject's response, the experimenter informed the subject of the
correct classification. This procedure, responding with feedback continued
until each of the 16 stimuli had again been presented. Following reinforce-
ment to the response to the last stimulus presented, another series of
blank trials was given using a different random order of the 16 stimuli.
Each series of 16 blank trials was thus followed by presentation of the
same 16 stimuli in the same order but with feedback. This alternation of
16 blank trials with 16 reinforced trials continued until the problem was
completed.
^3
APPENDIX D
Instructions
General
This is an experiment on ho\<r people learn to classify their environ-
ment. Your task in this experiment will be to learn to classify a series
of stimuli, which will shortly be described to you, into a number of
different categories. At first you will just be guessing, but after each
response that you make, you will be informed whether or not you were
correct. If you were incorrect, you will be informed vxhich category was
the correct one. If you pay attention to this information, which you
• receive about the correctness of your choices, you will eventually discover
a rule, or principle, which will enable you to classify each stimulus
correctly.
Before describing the exact procedure which vrill be followed during
this experiment, let me familiarize you with the stimuli which you will
be asked to classify.
(The entire stimulus population was then displayed to the subject one at
a time. It was pointed out that each stimulus was completely described
in terms of the values assumed by the four dimensions. The particvQ.ar
dimensions and their values were designated and the subject was given a
reference card which contained the stimulus dimensions and their values,)
Your task is to discover into which of two categories each of the
stimuli which were just described is to be placed. One category is
defined as all those stimuli which are examples of a concept which I will
select at the beginning of a problem, I will shortly give you an example
which will clarify what is meant by a concept. The other category will
include all the remaining stimuli. That is, all those stimuli which are
not examples of the concept. The concept itself is determined by two
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features. First, the concept is defined in terms of one or more of the
stinixaus values; second, the concept is defined on the basis of a rule
which specifies the relationship between the values.
Let's consider an illustration of how a concept may be defined.
A very simple conceptual rule is called the riile of "affirn^ation".
This rule specifies that the value chosen to define the concept, and we
refer to this value as the relevant value, must be present in order for
a stimulus to be an instance, or example, of the concept. For example,
consider a choice of as the relevant value. The rule of
affirmation states that if a stimulus has this value, that is, if the
value is present, the stimulus is an example of the concept
,
If that value is absent, the stimulus is not an example. Let us go through
the stimuli and I vri.ll ask you to classify each stimulus as an example
or non-example of this concept. If a stimulus is an example of the concept
we shall use the label positive to symbolize that the stimulus is a
positive example of the concept. If the value is absent, we shall use
the label "negative" to symbolize that the stimulus is not an example of
the concept, (Each of the 16 stimuli vxere then classified as positive
or negative by the subject on the basis of the affirmation rule and the
value selected for that subject)
Do you have any questions?
Now let me describe the exact procedure that will be followed during
this experiment. You will be presented with four separate problems to
solve. The solution to each problem will be based upon a concept defined
in terms of two values, where each value is from a different dimension,
and upon a conceptual rule which specifies which of the four combinations
of the presence or absence of these two values are examples of the concept
(belong in the positive category), and which combinations are not
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examples of the concept (belong in the negative category). For any two
values, each of the stimuli that will be presented represents one of the
four combinations of the presence or absence of these two values. For
example, if the two values selected for a particular problem were
then each stimulus is either and
^^t not
,
not and
, and not and not
Let us illustrate this by going through the stimuli again.
Your task is to discover which stimuli are to bo categorized as belonging
in the positive category and which stimuli are to be categorized as
belonging in the negative category. This means that you must discover two
.
thing«: what the rule being used is and to which two values the rule is
being applied.
In all there will be three problems each based upon a different rule.
Follov/ing these problems, you will be given a fourth problem based upon
one of these three rules.
Are there any questions?
For all conditions except CLNH special instructions as described below were
added to the above instructions,
CLIH
The exact procedure that will be used is as follows. I will present
each stimulus, one at a time, and ask you to give your best guess as to
whether that stiraulxis is or is not an example of the concept; you will
classify all of the stimuli without receiving any information from me as
to the correctness of your choice. After you have classified all the
stimuli according to your best guess as to what the concept is, I will
again designate each stiraulvis as positive or negative. This time, hox/ever,
you will be informed after each guess whether you were correct or incorrect.
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If you were incorrect you will be given the correct answer. We will con-
tinue to alternate between classifying stimuli without any feedback and
with feedback,
CLEH
In addition to classifying each stimulus as positive or negative, I
want you to tell me vihich two values you are basing your response upon.
That is, which two values you believe are relevant to the solution of the
problem,
CCNH
The exact procedure that I want you to follow is this : As has
already been point out, the solution to each problem requires the discovery
of the relevant two values and the rule which assigns the four combinations
of the presence or absence of these values to positive and negative
categories. Each problem will therefore be separated into two parts.
During the first part, your task is to discover which two values have
been selected to be relevant. Each time a stimulus is presented you are
to classify that stimulus as being one of the four combinations of the
two values you believe to be relevant. Here is a card which designates
the labels to be employed by you in categorizing each of the four possibil-
ities. (An explanation was given in the use of the truth-table format
displayed on the card, and it was pointed out that the TF and FT categories
would follow the order of dimensions listed on the reference card,) After
you have solved this part of the problem, you will continue to designate
each stimulus using the truth-table format, but, in addition, you will
designate whether you think each stimulus is a positive or negative example
of the concept.
^7
CCIH
Following the general instructions and the added instructions given
to CCNH. the added instructions given to CLIH were given with the appropriate
"
modifications to include response requirements for CCIH.
CCEH
Following the general instructions and the special instructions given
CCNH, the added instructions given to CLEH were presented with modification
to include response requirements appropriate to CCEH.
CRNH
The exact procedure to be used is as follows: As has already been
noted, the solution to each problem requires the discovery of the relevant
two values and the rule which assigns the four combinations of the presence
or absence of these values to positive and negative categories. Each trial
in this experiment will therefore be separated into two parts. During
the first part of each trial, you will designate each stimulus on the
basis of which of the four combinations of the two values you believe to
be relevant. Here is a card which describes the responses you are to use
to make these designations. (The card is presented and explained) After
you have classified each stimulus on this basis, you will be informed of
the correct classification. Following this information, you will then
designate whether you believe the stimulus belongs in the positive or
negative category. You will then be informed of the correctness of your
classification,
CRIH
The instructions given to CRM were followed with the instructions
presented to CLIH with the modifications necessary to take into account
response requirements.
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CREH
Following instructions given to CRNH, the instructions given to
CLEH were presented with the appropriate modifications to include response
requirements
,
I
APPENDIX E
-ge Number of Errors (E) and Trials (T) to Solution for
I Conceptual Rule; Biconditional (B), Conjunction (C).
and Disjunction (D), Obtained from Classification
of Stimuli into Positive and Negative
Categories for Groups CC and CR
T E
CCNH 10.5 5.2
CCIH 6.3 2.6
CCEH 7.1 3.2
AVG. 8.0 3.7
CRl^H 17.3 9.0
CRIH 8.
a
3.8
CREH 1^.8 6.6
AVG. 13.6 6.5
C
T E T
2.7 1.6 8.9
5.8 1.9 4.6
1.3 0.8 4.8
3.3 lA 6.1
12.3 5.7 14.4
6.3 2.4 9.4
10.1 4.4 20.0
9.6 4.2 14.6
AVG.
E T E
^.3 7.4 3.7
1.6 5.5 2.0
2.5 4.4 2.1
2.7 5.8 2.6
5.7 14.7 6.8
3.8 8.2 3.3
8.4 15.0 6.5
5.9 12.6 5.5
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